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Abstract—Mobile Crowdsourcing is a promising service
paradigm utilizing ubiquitous mobile devices to facilitate large-
scale crowdsourcing tasks (e.g. urban sensing and collaborative
computing). Many applications in this domain require Device-
to-Device (D2D) communications between participating devices
for interactive operations such as task collaborations and file
transmissions. Considering the private participating devices and
their opportunistic encountering behaviors, it is highly desired
to establish secure and trustworthy D2D connections in a fast
and autonomous way, which is vital for implementing practical
Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs). In this paper, we develop
an efficient scheme, Trustworthy Device Pairing (TDP), which
achieves user-transparent secure D2D connections and reliable
peer device selections for trustworthy D2D communications.
Through rigorous analysis, we demonstrate the effectiveness and
security intensity of TDP in theory. The performance of TDP is
evaluated based on both real-world prototype experiments and
extensive trace-driven simulations. Evaluation results verify our
theoretical analysis and show that TDP significantly outperforms
existing approaches in terms of pairing speed, stability, and
security.
Index Terms—Mobile Crowdsourcing, D2D Communications,
User-Transparent Pairing, Trustworthiness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart mobile devices have promoted the proliferation of
Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs), which facilitates
large-scale crowdsouring tasks by exploiting the capacities of
ubiquitous mobile users in a collaborative way [1]. Typical
MCS applications include mobile crowdsensing [2]–[5], in-
formation searching [6], crowdsourced content caching and
sharing [4], [5], and collaborative mobile could computing [7],
[8], etc. Many of these applications require exploiting the
collaborative interactions among individual participants in ge-
ographical proximity. For instance, in collaborative searching
applications (e.g. finding a missing child [6]), local searching
results are required to be shared among surrounding partici-
pators.
Such geographically proximal interactions can be achieved
by using Device-to-Device (D2D) communication (e.g. WiFi
direct and Bluetooth), which is much more agile and cost-
effective compared with using traditional cellular networks,
due to its shorter transmission delay, lower power consump-
tion, and ignorable financial cost [4], [9]. For instance, in
D2D-enabled mobile crowdsensing systems [4], [10]–[12], a
participating mobile user can report his or her sensory data to
the server via other participating phones through opportunistic
D2D transmissions rather than through cellular communi-
cations directly, which significantly improves the network
throughput and reduces the system financial cost. It has also
been shown that D2D communication is promising in cellular
traffic offloading in crowdsourced video streaming [1], [2] and
content sharing in mobile social networking [5]. In addition,
D2D communications are considered as the fundamental com-
munication infrastructure in more and more emerging mobile
could computing architectures [6], [7].
There exist an increasing number of efforts from both
academia and industry to develop D2D related communication
techniques, including efficient neighbor discovery [13], secure
device pairing [14]–[16], D2D enabled cellular networks [17],
incentivisation for D2D communications [4], [9], [18], and
D2D standards such as WiFi direct, Bluetooth Smart, and
LTE direct. However, these approaches cannot be directly
applied to achieve D2D-enabled MCSs, because they cannot
simultaneously satisfy the following three requirements in
practice:
1. Secure D2D Connection. Since participating devices are
privately held and temporarily recruited, there is no prior trust
relation between them. Therefore, establishing a shared secret
key for the firstly encountered devices (i.e. device pairing) is
vital for secure collaborative interactions.
2. Rapid and User-Transparent Connection. Due to the
opportunistic human contact behaviors, it is highly desired
to achieve rapid, autonomous, and user-transparent device
pairing processes. However, existing device pairing approaches
are based on either physical interactions (e.g. button clicks)
between firstly encountered devices or common contextual
information gathered gradually [15], [16], and are therefore
unsuitable for practical MCSs.
3. Addressing Peer Diversity. In a MCS, a participating
device could have multiple potential D2D peer devices and
need to choose the optimal one (or a set of optimal ones). This
optimization decision should depend on the trustworthiness
and other metrics (e.g. transmission data rate) of each candi-
date. As a result, a mechanism estimating the trustworthiness
of a certain device as a D2D peer is necessary to guarantee
the quality of D2D communications.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we present both theoretical and practical
studies to simultaneously achieve above three requirements.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We develop Trustworthy Device Pairing (TDP), the first
device pairing scheme for trustworthy opportunistic D2D
2communications in MCSs. TDP achieves rapid and user-
transparent device paring, which is not supported by
the off-the-shelf protocols or state-of-art user-transparent
approaches, without introducing extra pairing labors. In
addition, TDP introduces a new trust management method
for reliable peer device selections based on online trust-
worthiness estimation of D2D peers.
• Through rigorous security analysis, we demonstrate that
TDP is immune to six potential security threats, including
Passive Eavesdropping attacks, Impersonating attacks,
Man-in-the-Middle attacks, Trust Forging attacks, Inde-
pendent Negative Attacks, and Collusive attacks. Partic-
ularly, besides guaranteeing a comparable security inten-
sity to the off-the-shelf protocols, TDP can also resist
the Traffic-Oriented attacks that are detrimental to D2D
communications in MCSs.
• We implement TDP in the Android operating system
and the OMNeT++ simulator, and conduct real-world
experiments and extensive trace-driven simulations to
evaluate the performance of TDP. Results demonstrate
that TDP significantly outperforms existing approaches in
terms of pairing speed and stability, and it can effectively
eliminate the impact of Traffic-Oriented attacks in D2D-
enabled MCSs.
B. Paper Organization
The next section presents related work. Section III presents
the system model. The device trust estimation method in
D2D-enabled MCSs is presented in Section IV. Section V
presents the Trustworthy Device Pairing scheme. Real-world
experiments and extensive simulations are discussed in Section
VI. And we conclude this paper in Section VII. Discussions
on parameter determinations and security proofs are placed in
Appendices A and B respectively, which can be found in the
supplemental material.
II. RELATED WORK
D2D Communications: There exist a large body of D2D
communication based schemes, including efficient neighbor
discovery [13], D2D-enabled cellular networks [17], incen-
tivisation for D2D [4], [9], [18], network protocols [19], [20],
etc. Among those, the work [4], [9], [21] specifically consider
MCSs with D2D communications. However, none of these
work considers security issues.
Device Pairing: Device pairing focuses on establishing
shared keys between freshly encountered devices. Some ap-
proaches [22]–[25] rely on user-interactions to distribute initial
trust credentials. However, in D2D-enabled MCSs, mobile
users are normally strangers who are unlikely to conduct phys-
ical interactions. Since user-transparency is more preferable
for spontaneous pairing, the proximity-based approach [14]–
[16] attracts significant attentions, which authenticates adja-
cent devices leveraging locally sensed contextual information.
However, this approach commonly assumes that adversaries
have no sustained access to legal contextual information,
which is not acceptable for highly open MCSs. One of the
most relevant work is the non-interactive device pairing ap-
proach in [26], which, however, requires asynchronous broad-
casting of public credentials that may lead to unpredictable
pairing time fluctuations. In summary, none of No existing
device pairing approach can achieve both secure and user-
transparent D2D connections, as our TDP.
Trust Management: For participatory distributed systems,
trust management is an effective approach to enhance sys-
tem performance by determining the potential gain of self-
interested entities according to their trustworthiness [27], [28].
In traditional P2P systems, the trust framework is usually
applied for either enabling access control [29] or encourag-
ing benign resource sharing [30]. SepRep [31] establishes a
general Quality-of-Service (QoS) based trust framework for
heterogeneous P2P networks. For mobile P2P networks, [32]
proposes M-trust for accurate, robust and light-weight trust
rating aggregation. In proliferating MCS applications, existing
trust frameworks [33], [34] mainly focus on evaluating the
participator contribution from the data quality perspective.
In [35], a reputation-based trust framework is used to estimate
the trustworthiness of a mobile device in location authen-
tications, which is collaboratively conducted by proximal
devices using Bluetooth communications. Overall, existing
approaches maintain application-specific trustworthiness for
self-interested entities, which is usually estimated using upper-
level metrics without considering link-layer constrains. They
cannot be directly used to evaluate the trustworthiness of D2D
communications in MCSs.
The workshop abstract [36] presents the very initial idea of
our TDP, while this paper establishes a much more complete
and systematic trust management scheme with comprehensive
theoretical analysis. Furthermore, real-world experiments and
extensive trace-driven simulations are also conducted to study
the practical performance of TDP in realistic D2D-enabled
MCSs.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the model of general D2D-
enabled MCSs and potential attacks to opportunistic D2D
communications.
A. D2D-enabled MCS Architecture
The typical architecture of a D2D-enabled MCS is shown in
Fig.1: multiple participating personal mobile devices commu-
nicate with the Backend Server (BS) through the Internet via
WiFi or cellular access points, and they communicate with
devices opportunistically encountered through outband D2D
radios such as Bluetooth and WiFi direct.
Generally, the BS is responsible for the maintenance of
the entire MCS by establishing system regulations, publishing
crowdsourcing applications, publishing tasks and recording de-
vice profiles. Let N be the set of all regulated MCS task types
(e.g. mobile social networking, crowdsensing, collaborative
computing).
To participate in crowdsourcing tasks, personal mobile
devices need to install the crowdsourcing application and
register to the BS. Let D be the set of all registered devices.
Driven by a specific crowdsourcing task, any pair of registered
3Fig. 1: Architecture of D2D-Enabled MCSs.
devices can establish a secure D2D connection for further
communications, which is denoted as a D2D transaction for
the rest of the paper. A device a ∈ D can have a sequence of
D2D transactions i = {1, 2, ...} with any other device in D.
For the establishment of secure D2D connections, each de-
vice a ∈ D possesses a unique device pairing credential, which
is verifiable to both the BS and any other registered device
encountered. Meanwhile, a ‘trustvalue’ is maintained for each
device according to its behavior in previous D2D transactions,
which is treats as its trustworthiness to fulfill future transaction
requests. Here, the ‘trustvalue’ is the predominant concern of
the peer selection when there are multiple candidates.
B. Security Threats and Attack Models
Considering the sensitivity of personal mobile devices, nei-
ther devices opportunistically encountered nor the BS should
be fully trusted in MCSs.
Intuitively, potential attacks launched by malicious devices
within the D2D-enabled MCS can be divided into two cate-
gories: Connection-Oriented (CO) attacks and Traffic-Oriented
(TO) attacks. On one hand, CO attackers intend to compromise
the pairing process between encountered devices for illegal
communication contents or MCS services. In fact, the preven-
tion of CO attacks is the predominant concentration of security
mechanism of off-the-shelf D2D communication protocols (e.g
Bluetooth [25] and WiFi direct [24]). On the other hand,
the TO attackers are more interested in manipulating D2D
traffics in MCSs for simply unfair rewards (e.g. popularity,
credits) or future advanced attacks (e.g. false data injection
attacks). Unlike CO attacks, as far as we know, there is still
no systematic discussion on the impact and prevention of TO
attacks in MCSs from the perspective of opportunistic D2D
communications.
We formally model these potential attacks as follows (let
there be devices a, b,m ∈ D):
1. Passvie-Eavesdropping Attack (CO1): any third party
adversary m, who is not the intended end a or b of a D2D
transaction, tries to decrypt eavesdropped data;
2. Impersonating Attack (CO2): any adversary m, except
the device impersonated a, tries to use a’s credential to
establish D2D connections with others;
3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (CO3): any third party
adversary m, except both ends of a D2D transaction a and
b, tries to intercept and replace a (b)’s credential to establish
D2D connections with b (a) in middle without being noticed;
4. Trust Forging Attack (TO1): any adversary m forges
its trustvalue to attract unfair D2D transaction requests;
5. Independent Negative Attack (TO2): any adversary m
intentionally replies negative ratings (continuously or inter-
mittently) to downgrade others’ trustvalue and consequently
attract unfair D2D transaction requests;
6. Collusive Attack (TO3): any set of adversaries M
intentionally reply positive ratings to members within M and
negative ratings to others (continuously or intermittently) to
attract unfair D2D transaction requests.
Moreover, we should treat the BS as ‘benign but curious’:
generally, it will jeopardize neither the device pairing nor trust
management process for public credibility; meanwhile, it is
curious about the content of D2D transactions among devices.
In this case, the BS may try to launch CO1 attacks as a third
party adversary.
IV. DEVICE TRUST ESTIMATION IN D2D-ENABLED MCSS
In D2D-enabled MCSs, the reliability of a device to fulfill
future D2D requests can be reflected by its behavior in
historical transactions. In this paper, we denote this reliability
as the trustworthiness of a device, which is treated as the basic
metric for the peer selection in device pairing process (will be
discussed latter).
In this section, we develop an online method to: (1) ac-
curately estimate the trustworthiness of participating devices
according to their historical behaviors; (2) selectively profile
the device behavior during D2D transactions; (3) adjust the
device trustworthiness using behavior profiles at real-time.
A. Device Trustworthiness
We use the term of ‘trustvalue’ to quantitatively represent
the trustworthiness of each device, and, for the authenticity
concern, it can only be adjusted by the BS after each transac-
tion according to the device behavior.
Mathematically, let the trustvalue of each device a ∈ D after
its ith D2D transaction be a |N |-dimensional vector ta(i).
Here, the value of the nth (1 6 n 6 |N |) entry of ta(i)
is a value within the range of [0, 1], which represents the
trustworthiness of a fulfilling the nth type of D2D request
(for the corresponding type of MCS task).
Since the trustworthiness of a device should be gradually
built over a period of benign behaviors, we use the widely-
adopted Gompertz function [37] in reputation mapping to
compute the device trustvalue:
ta(i) = G(G
−1(ta(i − 1)) + ∆ta(i)), (1)
where, for a given vector x, G(x) denotes calculating the
value of the Gompertz function:
g(x) = e−e
−cgx (2)
for each entry of vector x, and the parameter cg determines
the sensitivity of trustvalue variation along time. ∆ta(i) is
the estimation of a’s behavior at its ith transaction, which is
computed by the BS according to behavior profiles uploaded
by participating devices (will be explained later).
4B. Device Behavior Profiling during D2D Transactions
For each D2D transaction, both ends of the transaction
profile necessary information that can objectively reflect each
other’s behavior, which is then recorded in a D2D receipt
respectively for future trustvalue adjustment at the BS. In-
tuitively, for a reasonable profiling of the ith D2D transaction
of a device a ∈ D (with its peer device b), the following
four factors should be recorded in a’s receipt (omitting index
i for concision): the Quality-of-Service (QoS) provided by the
D2D link qab, the credibility of b from a’s perspective cab, the
rating from b on a’s behavior rba, and the type of the current
transaction λa. Following is their specific definitions.
QoS: We use the link-layer QoS value qab to denote the
quality of the D2D link constructed by a given pair of
encountered devices a and b. Different QoS metrics are used
according to different D2D transactions, such as transmission
delay, data rate, or packet loss rate. For example, image-
based applications would require high data rate, while event-
monitoring tasks need small delay. In our system, qab is a
normalized value that can be obtained by both a and b during
their transactions.
We use link-layer QoS because it can precisely reflect the
application-layer QoS (due to the one-hop nature of D2D
transactions), and it is much easier to be estimated in practice.
For instance, if the minimal possible delay for transmitting
a given-size packet over a D2D link is 10 ms (computed
using datasheet), and the actual per-packet delay is 40 ms
(measured online), then the QoS value can be normalized as
qab = 10/40 = 0.25.
Credibility: The credibility estimation between encountered
devices is important for the evaluation of current behavior of
each other, considering their historical knowledge. In practice,
it is reasonable for a person to consider a stranger credible if
their judges to any common third party are similar. Inspired
by this, we estimate cab based on the comparability of contact
histories of both device a and device b. Without loss of
generality, let device a’s contact history Ea be a set of devices
that a has paired with during a trust management cycle
regulated by the BS. For each device x ∈ Ea, a value eax that
denotes the percentage of positive ratings from a to x is also
maintained by a, which is recorded in a vector θa according
to the encountering order of device x. eax will be refreshed
according to the rating from device a to device x whenever
they finish a D2D transaction. Specifically, cab is defined as:
cab = (αs
2
ab + (1− α)d
2
ab)wab, (3)
where sab is the similarity between percentages of positive
ratings separately replied by a and b to other devices, dab is the
relative diversity of percentages of positive ratings separately
replied by a and b to other devices, α within the range of
[0, 1] is used to adjust the focus of the credibility estimation,
and wab is the damping factor that is inversely proportion of
the intimacy between a and b.
In Eq.(3), sab and dab are defined as:
sab = 1−
√∑
x∈Eab
(eax − ebx)2
|Eab|
, (4)
dab = 1− |H(θa)−H(θb)| , (5)
where Eab = Ea ∩ Eb, and H(θ) is calculated as:
H(θ) =
√∑
16y6dim(θ)(θy − θ(y+1)moddim(θ))
2
dim(θ)
, (6)
where dim(θ) is θ’s dimensions, and θy is θ’s yth entry. wab
is used to restrict the credibility estimation between devices
that contact more frequently than normal, which is defined as:
wab =


1 if σab = 0
−cw(σab/σ¯)2 + 1 if 0 < σab 6 ⌊
√
1/cwσ¯⌋
0 if σab > ⌊
√
1/cwσ¯⌋
, (7)
where parameter cw determines the sensitivity of credibility
damping, σab is the transaction count between a and b, and σ¯
is the average transaction count of all devices within a trust
management cycle regulated by the BS.
Rating: The rating indicates the satisfactory of a device on
the behavior of its peer device in the current D2D transaction,
which is determined by the comparison of the QoS and
credibility of the current transaction with that of historical
transactions with any device. For the transaction between
devices a and b:
rab =
{
1 if βq2ab + (1 − β)c2ab > βq¯2a + (1 − β)c¯2a
−1 if βq2ab + (1 − β)c2ab < βq¯2a + (1 − β)c¯2a
, (8)
where q¯a and c¯a are the EWMAs of historical QoS and
credibility that are locally updated by device a after each
transaction, and β within the range of [0, 1] is used to adjust
the focus of the rating decision.
Transaction Type: The type of the current transaction is
profiled to estimate the trustworthiness of a device fulfilling
D2D requests from different type of MCS tasks respectively.
For a normalized and comparable profiling, we define λa as
a |N |-dimensional vector to represent a D2D transaction that
is initiated from device a. If the current transaction is a type-n
transaction, the nth entry of λa is a positive value within the
range of (0, 1], while all other entries are 0. The value of the
nth entry indicates resources (computing/communicating) that
are contributed by such a transaction, e.g. bandwidth, which
is determined according to the criteria regulated by the BS.
C. Device Trustworthiness Adjustment at the BS
According to the uploaded receipts, the BS can estimate the
behavior of a device in a D2D transaction. For instance, for
the ith transaction of a device a ∈ D (with its peer device b),
the BS can obtain qab, cab, rba and λa from a’s receipt.
From the BS’s perspective, one more thing should be
considered is that D2D transactions required by different
crowdsourcing tasks lead to different device trustvalue ad-
justment patterns (i.e. which end of the transaction should
have a trustvalue adjustment). For instance, for an outsourced
collaborative computing task, both ends of the D2D transaction
should have trustvalue adjustments because of their equal
contributions to task offloading.
Without loss of generality, for λa, the trustvalue adjust-
ment pattern pa is defined as an element of set P =
5{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} that indicates whether the initiator
(indicated by the 1st entry, role ra = (1, 0)) or the peer
(indicated by the 2nd entry, role ra = (0, 1)) should have a
trustvalue adjustment. Let Λ be the whole set of the transaction
types (λ). It is viable for the BS to establish a mapping:
f : Λ→ P (9)
that indicates which end of the transaction should have a
trustvalue adjustment according to the transaction type.
In this case, for the BS, the behavior estimation of device a
in its ith transaction ∆ta(i) in Eq.(1) is computed as (omitting
index i for concision):
∆ta = qabcabrbaf(λa)raλa. (10)
D. Trustvalue Bootstrapping
For the bootstrapping of the device trustvalue, an initial
value of e−1 (g(0)) is issued when the device joins the MCS.
Besides, for two devices freshly encountered (e.g. a and b,
where |Ea|, |Eb| or |Eab| is 0), the weight factor of rating β
is set as 1 to neglect the credibility factor. Therefore, any
device that freshly joins the MCS will not be starved and is
guaranteed a fair probability to be involved as long as behaving
well in D2D transactions.
E. Discussion on the Trust Estimation Method
In this subsection, we firstly provide justifications for the
trustvalue definition and device behavior profiling, then we
conduct comparisons between our method and the Josang
model [38] in the D2D-enabled MCS scenario.
1) Device Trustvalue Accumulation: Intuitively, we esti-
mate the trustworthiness of a device performing D2D trans-
actions according to its historical behaviors. The trustvalue of
a device is determined by the accumulation of its quantified
behavior profiles (Eq.(1)).
Considering that any freshly joint device with continu-
ously positive (negative) behaviors deserves a rapid trust-
value enhancement (decrement), and that the trustvalue itself
should be normalized for effective comparisons, we use a
type of sigmoid function, i.e. the Gompertz Function [37]
g(x) = e−e
−cgx (see Fig.A1 (a) in Appendix A.1), to map
the behavior accumulation to the device trustvalue. Any other
function with similar properties, e.g. the Logistic Function [39]
l(x) = 1/(1+e−clx) (see Fig.A1 (a) in Appendix A.1), is also
applicable in trustworthiness mapping.
One thing should be noted is that the value of cg determines
the sensitivity of trustvalue variations. We provide an instance
for cg determination in Appendix A.1.
2) Device Credibility Estimation: Intuitively, to stimulate
more D2D transactions, devices with benign and stable be-
haviors in extensive active scopes should be guaranteed higher
credibilities.
The first metric of credibility estimation is the comparability
of the behavior profiles separatively maintained by both ends
of the transaction. We assume that devices strictly follow-
ing MCS regulations receive relatively similar ratings from
different devices, then the comparability is quantified by the
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transaction Number
Tr
us
tv
al
ue
 
 
t (50%)
t’(50%)
t (20%)
t’(20%)
t (80%)
t’(80%)
(a) Impact of Positive Ratings
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transaction Number
Tr
us
tv
al
ue
 
 
t (1.0)
t’(1.0)
t (0.5)
t’(0.5)
t (0.2)
t’(0.2)
(b) Impact of D2D Profiles
Fig. 2: Comparisons between TDP and the Josang Model.
similarity (Eq.(4)) and the relative diversity (Eq.(5)) of their
contact histories. Specifically, the similarity estimation encour-
ages devices to objectively reflect other’s behavior through
justifiable ratings, while that the diversity estimation restricts
devices from downgrading other’s trustvalue with extreme or
discriminative ratings.
Besides, to prevent the potential trustvalue boost caused
by massive meaningless D2D transactions between collusive
devices, the intimacy between both ends of a transaction
is treated as a damping factor of their credibility (Eq.(7)),
i.e. suspiciously frequent contacts lead to rapid credibility
decreases. We use a type of monotonic descending function,
i.e. a quadratic function w(σ) = −cw(σ/σ¯)2 +1, to represent
the relation between the device contact number σ and the
damping factor w (see Fig.A2 (a) in Appendix A.2). Any
other function with similar properties, e.g. a cubic function
w(σ) = −cw(σ/σ¯)
3 +1 (see Fig.A2 (a) in Appendix A.2), is
also applicable.
One thing should be noted is that the value of cw determines
the sensitivity of credibility damping on the device intimacy.
We provide an instance for cw determination in Appendix A.2.
3) Comparison with the Josang Trust Model: In this part,
we compare the effectiveness of our trust estimation method
and that of the Josang trust model [38], one of the most
representative trust estimation methods, in D2D-enabled MCS
scenarios.
Specifically, the Josang model [38] leverages the beta prob-
ability density function to map the reputation of self-interested
entities, whose expectation is treated as entity trustworthiness
on fulfilling future transactions. According to [38], we calcu-
late the trustvalue based on the Josang model of each device
a after its ith transaction as:
t′a(i) =
Countp(i) + 1
Countp(i) + Countn(i) + 2
, (11)
where Countp(i) and Countn(i) denote the number of posi-
tive and negative ratings that a receives after its ith transaction,
respectively.
For comparison, we conducted two sets of numerical simu-
lations to study the impact of the positive rating percentage and
the D2D profile on the accuracy and sensitivity of trustworthi-
ness mapping of our method and the Josang model. For each
round of simulation, we recorded the trustvalue variation (t for
our method, and t′ for the Josang model) of a single device
a in 200 transactions. For our method, we set t0 = e−1, and
t was updated after each transaction based on the rating and
6D2D profiles (i.e. QoS and credibility); for the Josang model,
we set t′0 = 1, and t′ was updated after each transaction based
on the rating only.
In the first set of simulations, we set that device a got a
positive rating at different probabilities (i.e. 50%, 20% and
80%) and a random D2D profile within the range of [0, 1] in a
transaction. As shown in Fig.2 (a), both models can maintain
a distinguishable trustvalue with a similar adjusting trend.
However, their sensitivities are obviously different: for more
extreme cases (i.e. 20% and 80%), our method guarantees a
gradual accumulation of the device trustworthiness, whereas
the Josang model just presents a rapid trust convergence;
for the neutral case (i.e. 50%), our device trustworthiness is
adjusted more sensitively because of more objective device
behavior estimations.
In the second set of simulations, we set that device a got
a positive rating with a 50% probability and a random D2D
profile within different ranges (i.e. [0, 1], [0, 0.5] and [0, 0.2]) in
a transaction. As shown in Fig.2 (b), TDP manages to maintain
a more distinguishable and sensitive trustvalue compared to
the Josang model. In D2D-enabled MCSs, it is not objective
to estimate the trustworthiness of a device only based on
ratings from other peers. Counting more detailed information
into trustworthiness estimation not only guarantees a better
objectivity but also provides devices a fair chance to attract
more transactions with better behaviors.
V. THE TRUSTWORTHY DEVICE PAIRING (TDP) SCHEME
With the accurate trustworthiness estimated by the method
in Section IV, in this section, we develop TDP to realize
rapid, user-transparent, and trustworthy device pairing for
D2D-enabled MCSs.
A. Overview
Considering the security threats in Subsection III-B, TDP
establishes a Certificate-Less Public Key Cryptography (CL-
PKC) [40] framework to issue a unique private-public key
pair to each registered device as the D2D credential. Since
the credential is collaboratively generated by the BS and the
registering device, it is verifiable to any other registered device
as well as the BS.
Based on the credential, any pair of registered devices
encountered can negotiate a shared key spontaneously without
contacting the BS, which introduces no extra labor compared
with existing device pairing methods. Besides, because a part
of the credential is privately held by the device only, the
‘benign but curious’ BS cannot restore such shared keys to
decrypt the transaction contents. Moreover, according to the
D2D receipts authenticated by the credential, participating
devices of D2D transactions can have justifiable trustvalue
adjustments from the BS based on their behaviors, which will
guarantee a well-behaving device a fair advantage in peer
selections in future D2D transactions.
Specifically, TDP consists of three components: device
registration, device pairing, and device trustvalue manage-
ment, whose basic procedure is illustrated in Fig.3. Specific
operations are presented as follows.
Fig. 3: Architecture of TDP.
TABLE I: System Parameters of TDP.
Parameter Meaning Note
E
an elliptic curve on a
finite filed Fq
treated as a cyclic
addition group Gq ; q: a
large prime as the group
order; P : the generator
of Gq
x
a random positive
integer < q
(x ∈R Z∗q )
the master private key,
only possessed by the BS
Ppub
a point on E
(Ppub = xP )
the master public key;
xP : the point
multiplication on E
h0,1,2
one-way hash
functions
h0 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗;
h1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗;
h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗
B. Device Registration
In this process, the BS generates and issues a D2D creden-
tial to each registering device.
For the system initialization, the BS determines all sys-
tem parameters in Table I. Then, the parameter set Ω =
{Fq, Gq, P, Ppub, h0, h1, h2} and the bootstrapping trustvalue
t0 are deployed in the crowdsourcing application.
To join the MCS, personal mobile devices need to install
the crowdsourcing application and register to the BS. Without
loss of generality, let device a register to the BS. Specific
operations (Step 1.1-1.3 in Fig.3) are demonstrated in Fig.4,
where the operator‘‖’ denotes the concatenation operation.
Fig. 4: Device Registration (Step 1 in Fig.3).
Here, device a determines its local partial key pair (xa, Pa),
where Pa = xaP . Then the BS extracts an authenticated
partial key pair (da, Ra) according to Pa. Finally, (ska, pka),
7Fig. 5: Device Pairing (Step 2 in Fig.3).
where ska = (da, xa) and pka = (Pa, Ra), is treated as a’s
credential. Meanwhile, the BS records (a, ra, da, Pa, ta).
C. Device Pairing
In this process, any pair of registered devices encountered
use their credentials to negotiate a shared key for a secure
D2D connection.
To accomplish a specific kind of D2D transaction, the
initiator a selects a peer b among multiple available candidates
considering their device trustvalues and other states (e.g. D2D
channel signal strength). Then a and b start the device pairing.
Specific operations (Step 2 in Fig.3) are demonstrated in Fig.5,
where ‘⊕’ denotes the xor operation, and Enc(x, y) and
Dec(x, y) denote the symmetric encryption and decryption
with x as the key and y as the plaintext. The shared key kab
is generated according to a and b’s credentials. la(b) and na(b)
are random numbers guaranteeing the freshness of kab and the
Challenge-Response messages C and F , respectively.
D. Device Trustvalue Management
In this process, each end of a finished D2D transaction
generates a verifiable receipt to profile the current transaction,
which is uploaded to the BS for trustvalue adjustment.
D2D Transaction Receipt Generation: After the ith D2D
transaction of device a (the jth of device b), a and b generate
receipts that record both the transaction information and the
profiles of each other’s behavior.
Specific operations (Step 3.1 in Fig.3) are demonstrated in
Fig.6. Note that all interactions between a and b are encrypted
by kab (the symmetric cryptography operation (Enc,Dec)
and the transaction indexes (i, j) are omitted for conciseness).
Here, a and b exchange the contact histories Ea and Eb
(together with θa and θb) to calculate each other’s credibility
cab = cba. Then, considering the QoS of the D2D link qab =
qba and the knowledge of historical transactions q¯a(b) and
c¯a(b), device a(b) generates a rating rab(ba) to evaluate b(a)’s
behavior. For the integrity and accountability concerns, the
rating is encrypted before exchanged that only the generator
and the BS can decrypt. T1,2,3 are signatures that are generated
using the credentials of a, b, and the BS combined, while t0
Fig. 6: D2D Receipt Generation (Step 3 in Fig.3).
is used to guarantee the signature freshness. Reab(ba) is the
receipt of device a(b).
Trustvalue Adjustment: Since D2D receipts will expire
after a certain period of time, participating devices will upload
locally verified receipts to the BS (Step 3.2.1 in Fig.3) when
there is a cost-effective Internet access (e.g. free WiFi).
When device a uploads Reab, the BS can get the transaction
information and behavior profiles including a, b, cab, qab,λab
and rba = Dec(db, erba). To verify the validity of Reab, the
BS computes
h′b = h2(erba‖cab‖qab‖λab), (12)
then, according to the partial key pairs of a and b, the BS
verifies whether
dah
′
b
db
T2b = T1b (13)
holds. If Eq.(13) holds, the receipt is valid.
With a verified receipt, according to Eq.(1) and (10), the
trustvalue of device a can be adjusted.
For the integrity and authenticity concerns, the BS generates
a signature for each adjusted device trustvalue. For device a
discussed above, the BS generates
T4bs =
lbstau
x+ ra
,
T5bs = lbsP,
(14)
where lbs ∈R Z∗q is used to guarantee the signature freshness,
ta is the adjusted trustvalue of device a, and u is a |N |-
dimensional unit vector.
Then ta‖T4bs‖T5bs is replied to device a (Step 3.2.2 in
Fig.3). Any device that encounters a can verify whether
T4bs(Ppub +Ra) = tauT5bs (15)
holds. If Eq.(15) holds, the trustvalue is valid.
Until now, TDP realizes the secure device pairing and the
online trust management in D2D-enabled MCSs.
8E. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct theoretical analysis to demon-
strate the security intensity of TDP confronting potential
threats in D2D-enabled MCSs (Subsection III-B). Note that
we consider the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem on
Elliptic Curves (ECDHP) [41] as intractable for any adversary
with finite resources, which is clarified as follows:
Let E be an elliptic curve on a finite field Fq , whose
generator is P : given P , aP and bP , where a, b ∈ Z∗q , the
computation of abP is intractable.
1) Confronting CO Attacks: Adversaries launch CO attacks
to compromise the device pairing process between registered
devices. Without loss of generality, let an adversary m ∈ M
(M⊂ D) be a registered device, who has a verifiable creden-
tial (skm, pkm), that tries to compromise the device pairing
process between benign devices a, b ∈ D. In Appendixes B.1
to B.3, we demonstrate TDP’s immunity to all CO attacks
in Subsection III-B, which indicates its comparable security
intensity to the off-the-shelf protocols [24], [25].
2) Confronting TO Attacks: Adversaries launch TO attacks
to manipulate D2D traffics. Without loss of generality, let a
set of adversaries M ⊂ D be multiple registered devices
with verifiable credentials. They try to, either independently or
collusively, attract unfair D2D transaction requests than benign
devices in D do. In Appendixes B.4 to B.6, we demonstrate
TDP’s resistance to all TO attacks in Subsection III-B, which
can effectively prevent traffic manipulations in D2D-enabled
MCSs.
F. Case Studies
In this part, we conduct two case studies to demonstrate how
to apply TDP to mobile collaborative computing tasks [7], [8]
and mobile crowdsensing tasks [4], [9], [21].
Collaborative Computing Tasks: In a mobile crowd-
computing task, the BS outsources computing requests to
registered devices through the crowdsourcing application. Let
device a accept the task and recruit peer devices for collabora-
tive computing. By investigating the status of nearby devices,
including the trustvalue in terms of collaborative computing,
a determines its peer devices and then conducts device pairing
with each one of them.
During the pairing process between a and one of the
recruited devices b, both of them use registered credentials
(sk, pk) to negotiate, generate and verify a shared key kab,
which is used to secure D2D communications during the task.
After the computing task, recruited devices reply ratings to
demonstrate their satisfactory. To generate the receipt, a and b
exchange Ea and Eb using the established secure connection.
Then receipts from a and b, i.e. Reab and Reba, are generated
using the credentials of a, b and the BS.
When there is a cost-effective access to the Internet (e.g.
free WiFi at work, home or a cafe), a and b separately upload
the receipts to the BS. After authenticating the receipts, the BS
will adjust their trustvalues according to Eq.(1) and (10). For
the collaborative computing, since both ends of the transaction
equally contribute, both ends will have a trustvalue adjustment
(i.e. f(λab) = (1, 1)). Then the BS generates signatures for
Fig. 7: D2D-Enabled MCS Prototype Illustration.
TABLE II: Implementation Details of TDP.
Schemes BTDP WTDP
D2D Channel Bluetooth v3.0 [25] WiFi direct v1.5 [24]
ROM 4.20 MB 7.47 MB
RAM 19.29 MB 23.54 MB
Cryptography
Primitives
ECC-secp160r1,
AES-128 [42], [43]
ECC-secp160r1,
AES-128 [42], [43]
their adjusted trustvalues. Finally, the adjusted trustvalues and
signatures are replied to a and b for future D2D transactions.
Mobile Crowdsensing Tasks: In a mobile crowdsensing
task, the BS outsources a sensing request to a participating
device a to collect and report sensing data. Perhaps there are
Internet-access or cost issues and a requires a peer device to
deliver its data packets in a D2D manner. By investigating the
status of nearby devices, including the trustvalue in terms of
packet delivery, a selects a peer device b and conducts device
pairing with it.
The device pairing and D2D receipt generation in such a
mobile crowdsensing task are similar to that in the last case,
therefore we make no further discussion for conciseness.
For the packet delivery, only the device that initiates the
data transmission, which is device a in this case, will have an
‘actual’ trustvalue adjustment (i.e. f(λab) = (1, 0)). Therefore
the peer device that receives packets will try further deliveries
to get a trustvalue adjustment. Then the BS generates a
signature for a’s adjusted trustvalue. Finally, the adjusted
trustvalue and signatures are replied to a and b (no change)
for future D2D transactions.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of TDP by both
prototype experiments and trace-driven simulations.
A. Real-world Experiments
As shown in Fig.7, we constructed a MSC prototype con-
sisting of:
• A PC based BS: A Dell OPTIPLEX 9010 with Linux
Mint 17.3-64bit, Intel Core i5-3470 3.2GHz CPU, and
8GB RAM.
• Five Android devices: Google Nexus5 with Android
4.4.4, Qualcomm Snapdragon 800 2.3GHz CPU, 2GB
RAM, and 16GB ROM.
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Fig. 8: Off-the-Shelf Pairing Time Comparison.
Devices can communicate with the BS through WiFi and
communicate with each other through D2D channels.
As shown in Table II, we implemented two versions of TDP
as independent security services upon user-transparent but in-
secure D2D connections on Android mobile devices: BTDP is
based on a Bluetooth connection in the JustWork mode [25],
and WTDP is based on a WiFi direct connection in the
ServiceDiscovery mode [24] whose mandatory manual
authentication of WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) is blocked. Our
implementation adopted the cryptography primitives in [42],
[43].
In prototype experiments, we evaluated the performance of
device pairing and trust management processes.
1) Device Pairing Study: In this set of experiments, we
evaluated the performance of TDP device pairing process.
Specifically, we considered pairing time, i.e. the time con-
sumed from the device discovery to the establishment of
a shared key, as the performance metric to measure the
pairing speed. We compared BTDP and WTDP with original
Bluetooth and WiFi direct with default settings 1. As shown
in Fig.8 (a) and (b), 20 pairing time samples were collected
for BTDP (and original Bluetooth) and WTDP (and original
WiFi direct) respectively.
Fig.8 (a) shows that both the mean and standard deviation
(std) of the pairing time of BTDP are smaller than that of
original Bluetooth pairing. This demonstrates that the pairing
process of BTDP is not only faster, but also more stable, in
comparison with Bluetooth. The autonomous key negotiation
of BTDP avoids undetermined delays caused by manual con-
firmations in original Bluetooth pairing. It shortens the pairing
time and limits any potential fluctuations other than that caused
by Bluetooth device discovery itself.
From Fig.8 (b), we can see that WTDP outperforms WiFi
Direct in terms of pairing stability (by avoiding potential
manual operation delays), but its average pairing speed is
slower. Different from the BTDP implemented on the insecure
but autonomous Bluetooth connections (i.e. the JustWork
mode of Bluetooth [25]), there exists no such WiFi direct
connecting mode available for WTDP 2. Therefore, we had to
implement WTDP in the ServiceDiscovery mode [24]
1Note that we did our best to shorten the reactive time whenever there was
a physical interaction (i.e. manual confirmations for pairing requests: PIN
comparison, pairing button click).
2The default WiFi direct pairing is in the ActiveScan mode [24], which
requires both users to scan simultaneously for device discovery.
TABLE III: User-Transparent Pairing Time.
Related
Schemes
Miettinen
et al. [15]
Truong et
al. [16]
Lentz et
al. [26]
TDP
(B/W)
Secret
Extraction/s 120 10 No need No need
Key
Negotiation/s
Not
considered
Not
considered
Not
specified 7.25/9.72
Fluctuation/% Not
specified
Not
specified 0-100 10.2/15.4
of WiFi direct for autonomous device discovery, and block
the mandatory manual confirmation in the Android Wifip2p
service. This inefficient implementation somehow emulated
insecure but autonomous WiFi direct connections, but leading
to significant performance degradation of our approach, i.e.
each recorded pairing time of WTDP consists of both an
entire round of original WiFi direct pairing and our upper-
layer security service.
Table III compares the pairing time of TDP and state-of-the-
art user-transparent device pairing approaches that are promis-
ing in implementing D2D-enabled MCSs. The proximity-
based approaches in [15] and [16] collect contextual data for
120s and 10s respectively to generate key materials, and the
time for key negotiation and authentication is not considered.
The non-interactive approach in [26] pairs up two devices
based on a series of asynchronous broadcasts of device public
key materials with a 60s or 120s interval. it is possible that
a pairing time fluctuation up to 100% will be introduced.
Compared with them, TDP has no requirement on contextual
information collection or device proximity, and its pairing fluc-
tuation is well restricted without the synchronization concern.
2) Trust Management Study: This set of experiments for
trust management evaluation were based on BTDP pairing.
Specifically, we adopted the average RSSI of the Bluetooth
channel measured by both ends at the start of device pairing
process as the metric for QoS estimation. The RSSI values
were normalized, i.e. proportionally mapped from the range of
[-100 dBm, 0dBm] to [0, 1]. According to Eq.(8), the rating
that reflects the device behavior during a D2D transaction can
be either QoS-driven or Credibility-Driven by adjusting the
value of β. Therefore, we conducted two sets of experiments
that separately focused on QoS (β = 0.8) and Credibility
(β = 0.2), meanwhile we monitored the variation of device
trustvalue and the direction of D2D traffic within the system.
Each set of experiments had 40 D2D transactions. At an
experiment round, registered devices (Devices 1-5) took turns
to post a transaction request and autonomously paired with the
most trustworthy device that was visible. One of the devices
(in turn) was excluded from candidates for a single round.
During the experiments, only the trustvalue of transactions that
lead to trust variations at the peer side was considered. We set
the average transaction count σ¯ = 30. As a result, the trust
accumulation sensitivity cg = 0.5 and the damping sensitivity
cw = 0.5 according to Eq.(A1) and (A2) respectively. The
credibility sensitivity α = 0.5.
Fig.9 shows the results of the QoS-driven experiments.
Here, each device was carried by a student roaming around the
laboratory to introduce QoS variations. The majority of D2D
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Fig. 10: Credibility-Driven Trust Management.
requests were attracted by Devices 2-4. For Devices 3 and 4,
a higher QoS boosts their trustvalue and vice versa. Moreover,
since Device 2 has a trustvalue boost at the beginning due to
our device encountering setting, it stays in a dominant position
all the time compared with others. Even it provides lower QoS
for a while, its trustvalue has no severely but only a slightly
drop since almost all of contact histories of others are with
Device 2. To avoid such kind of monopoly, β should be well
adjusted to offer devices with inherently lower QoS a chance
for a trustvalue boost with higher credibilities.
Fig.10 shows the results of Credibility-driven experiments.
Here, Devices 4 and 5 were set to reply negative ratings in
all D2D transactions to introduce credibility differences. The
majority of D2D requests were attracted by Devices 2 and
3. Devices 4 and 5 only attracted two requests because of
low credibilities. For Devices 2 and 3, transactions with a
credibility around 0.1 were conducted with Device 4 or 5.
The influence of ratings with abnormal credibilities on the
trustvalue of Devices 2 and 3 is nearly negligible. When they
conduct transactions with other devices, a higher credibility
boosts their trustvalue and vice versa. Actually, to encourage
users refining their QoS, β should be well adjusted to offer
devices with lower credibilities a chance for a trustvalue boost
with higher QoS.
B. Trace-Driven Simulations
To study the practical performance of TDP in larger-
scale MCSs, we constructed extensive trace-driven simulations
based on OMNeT++ 4.6 [44], by using real human mobility
data collected from the IEEE Infocom’05 conference [45] and
the ACM Sigcomm’09 conference [46]. The settings of these
two sets of simulations are as follows:
• The Infocom’05 Trace was used for constructing a
D2D-enabled MCS with 41 registered devices. Here, the
connecting time of D2D channels between encountered
devices was used to estimate the D2D QoS. According
to the simulation result with no attacker, we set the
average transaction count σ¯ = 110. Therefore sensitivities
cg = 0.14 and cw = 0.5 according to Eq.(A1) and (A2)
respectively. For Eq.(3), we set α = 0.5 to equally treat
the similarity and diversity, and β = 0.1 for Eq.(8) to
compensate the inherent unfairness on the device QoS.
According to duration of the Infocom’05 trace, each
round of simulations lasted for 30000 simulation seconds,
which was treated as a single trustvalue management
cycle.
• The Sigcomm’09 Trace has nearly twice node records
than the Infocom’05 trace. By using this trace, a D2D-
enabled MCS with 76 devices was constructed to evaluate
the scalability of TDP. Here, the volume of data trans-
mitted through D2D channels was used to estimate the
D2D QoS. In this set of simulations, we set σ¯ = 31,
cg = 0.5, cw = 0.5, α = 0.5 and β = 0.1. Each round
of simulations lasted for 15000 simulation seconds.
In all simulations, devices can spontaneously register to the
BS and publish or accept D2D requests. The trustvalue was
treated as the unique metric for peer selections. Meanwhile,
since the type of D2D transactions has no impact on the
performance of TDP, we only considered the trustvalue of
transactions that lead to trust variations at the peer side.
1) Performance Metrics: Since the goal of TO attackers
in D2D-enabled MCSs is to get unfair advantages in peer
selections over benign devices, we collected the following two
metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of TDP against potential
traffic manipulations:
• Device Trustvalue, the time-varying device trustvalue,
whose cumulative distribution indicates whether mali-
cious behaviors of TO attackers downgrade the trustwor-
thiness of benign devices. Ideally, TDP should be able to
automatically downgrade the trustvalue of TO attackers
without disturbing (downgrading) the trustvalue of benign
devices;
• False Positive Transactions Numbers, the number of
transactions attracted by TO attackers from benign de-
vices, which quantifies the impact of traffic manipulations
of TO attackers. Ideally, TDP should be able to automat-
ically limit the number of transactions attracted by TO
attackers.
In our simulations, participating devices in the MCS were
divided into two categories: attackers and benign devices,
whose trustvalue and false positive transactions were recorded
separately for analysis. For comparison, we ran two simula-
tions with no attacker for both the Infocom and Sigcomm
traces (i.e. the original scenario). For the rest of the paper, we
use the Cumulative Distribution Figure (CDF) to present the
trustvalue of both benign devices and TO attackers, and we
use the Time Variance Figure (TVF) to present the number of
false positive transactions attracted by TO attackers.
2) Impact of Attacker Percentage: In this set of simula-
tions, different percentages (5%, 10%, and 15%) of registered
devices were randomly selected as attackers that were con-
tinuously launching TO attacks. The results of the Infocom
11
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Fig. 11: Impact of Different Attacker Percentages (Infocom).
and Sigcomm simulations are shown in Fig.11 and Fig.12
respectively.
For both sets of simulations, the impact of TO2 attacks is
well eliminated in all three scenarios: the average trustvalue
of benign devices is not obviously affected compared with the
original scenario (e.g. benign-TO2 (0.46/9.5%↑) vs benign-
none (0.42) in Fig.11 (a)). However, the average trustvalue of
attackers is severely downgraded because of their TO2 attacks
(e.g. attacker-TO2 (0.13/50%↓) vs attacker-none (0.26) in
Fig.11 (a)). Meanwhile, the false positive transaction number
also decreases when there are TO2 attacks (e.g. benign-TO2
(1612/13.5%↓) vs benign-none (1864) in Fig.11 (b)).
For the Infocom simulations, the impact of TO3 attacks
is well eliminated in all three scenarios. For the Sigcomm
simulations, when the attacker percentage is 15%, the impact
of TO3 attacks cannot be neglected. However, in general,
it is well accepted that devices in the MCS should form a
relatively good community with small percentage of malicious
devices (e.g. 4% in [47] and 10% in [48]). For the scenario
with the attacker percentage up to 10%, TDP manages to
effectively eliminate the impact of TO3 attacks.
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Fig. 12: Impact of Different Attacker Percentages (Sigcomm).
3) Impact of Attackers with Different Properties: In this
set of simulations, considering that TO attacks from more
trustworthy or popular devices may cause deeper impacts,
we specifically selected a fixed percentage of devices with
different properties as continuous TO attackers, i.e. top 7%
devices in average trustvalue (TopTV) or top 7% devices in
transaction count (TopTC) in the original scenario. The results
of the Infocom and Sigcomm simulations are shown in Fig.13
and Fig.14 respectively.
For both sets of simulations, the impact of TO2 attacks is
well eliminated in all two scenarios: there is no obvious impact
on the average trustvalue of benign devices (e.g. benign-TO2
(0.41/9.8%↑) vs benign-none (0.37) in Fig.13 (a)), while
the average trustvalue of attackers is severely downgraded
(e.g. attacker-TO2 (0.44/48.2%↓) vs attacker-none (0.85) in
Fig.13 (a)), and the number of false positive transactions also
decreases correspondingly (e.g. benign-TO2 (6737/29.7%↓) vs
benign-none (9579) in Fig.13 (b)).
For the Infocom simulations, the impact of TO3 attacks from
TopTV devices is well eliminated according to Fig.13 (a) and
(b). In the TopTC scenario, attackers have a boost in terms
of the average trustvalue (i.e. attacker-TO3 (0.53/65.6%↑) vs
12
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Fig. 13: Impact of Attackers with Different Properties (Infocom).
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Fig. 14: Impact of Attackers with Different Properties (Sigcomm).
attacker-none (0.32) in Fig.13 (c)) and the number of attracted
transactions (i.e. attacker-TO3 (8758/9.9%↑) vs attacker-none
(7969) in Fig.13 (d)). However, the impact on the average
trustvalue of benign devices is negligible (i.e. benign-TO3
(0.40/7.0%↓) vs benign-none (0.43) in Fig.13 (c)). For the
Sigcomm simulations with TO3 attacks, the average trustvalue
of attackers remains similar, and the number of attracted
transactions has a slightly boost in all two scenarios. In fact,
the impact of TO3 attacks on benign devices is difficult
to be restricted only when the collusive attackers possess
predominant popularities (i.e. 6%1.17% = 512.8% of the average
popularity of benign devices for the Infocom TopTC scenario,
4.42%
1.05% = 421% and
5.66%
1.02% = 555% for the Sigcomm TopTV
and TopTC scenarios respectively). However, considering it
is irrational for the most popular devices to collude in reality
because of the low cost-efficiency, TDP manages to effectively
eliminate the impact of TO3 attacks from devices with ratio-
nally advanced trustworthiness or popularity.
4) Impact of Attacking Intensity: In this set of simulations,
to study the impact of TO attacks with different intensities,
we randomly selected a fixed percentage (7%) of devices as
attackers that launch TO attacks in each D2D transaction with
different probabilities (i.e. 0, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 100%). The
results of the Infocom and Sigcomm simulations are shown in
Fig.15 and Fig.16 respectively.
For the Infocom simulations, the impacts of both TO2
and TO3 attacks are well eliminated: compared with the
original scenario, the average trustvalue of attackers is in
inverse proportion to the attack intensity (e.g. attacker-30%
(0.66/22.4%↓), attacker-50% (0.49/42.4%↓) vs attacker-none
(0.85) in Fig.15 (a)). The number of false positive transactions
also decreases in direct proportion to the attack intensity (e.g.
benign-30% (8047/16.0%↓), benign-50% (7156/25.3%↓) vs
attacker-none (9579) in Fig.15 (b)).
For the Sigcomm simulations, the results are basically the
same except for the 30% scenarios. For both 30% TO2 and
TO3 attacks, attackers have a slightly boost in terms of the
average trustvalue and the number of attracted transactions.
In fact, since the device contact in the Sigcomm trace is
relatively sparse compared to the Infocom trace (i.e. 31 vs
110 in terms of the average transaction count of participating
devices), system’s reaction to TO attacks is correspondingly
slower. However, the impacts of the 30% TO attacks on the
trustvalue of benign devices are negligible (e.g. benign-30%
(0.85/1.2%↑) vs benign-none (0.86) in Fig.16 (a)). Therefore,
TDP manages to effectively eliminate the impact of TO attacks
with different intensities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop TDP, a rapid, user-transparent, and
trustworthy device pairing scheme for Mobile Crowdsouring
Systems (MCS) with opportunistic Device-to-Device (D2D)
communications. We first develop a formal method to estimate
the trustworthiness of participating devices at real-time. Then,
we propose a CL-PKC based credential framework that allows
each encountered device to spontaneously establish a secure
D2D connection with the most trustworthy peer nearby. We
theoretically prove that TDP manages to achieve a comparable
security intensity with the off-the-shelf protocols and the
immunity to the TO attacks that are not considered by existing
approaches. Through real-world experiments using Android
devices, we show that TDP outperforms existing approaches
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Fig. 15: Impact of Attacks with Different Intensities (Infocom).
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Fig. 16: Impact of Attacks with Different Intensities (Sigcomm).
in terms of pairing speed and stability. In addition, extensive
trace-driven simulation results verify that TDP manages to
effectively prevent the traffic manipulation of TO attackers in
large-scale MCSs. Interesting future work is to apply TDP to
specific MCS applications such as D2D-enabled mobile social
networking and mobile cloud computing.
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APPENDIX A
A. Determination of cg
Taking the gompertz function g(x) = e−e−cgx as an in-
stance, assuming that the average contact number of registered
devices within a trustvalue management cycle is 50 and there
is an equal probability for a device to get a positive or a
negative rating, if the average behavior estimation for a D2D
transaction is 0.125 (q, c, λ = 0.5), the value of cg can be
determined by solving:
...
g (50× 0.5× 0.125) = 0, (A1)
where
...
g (x) is the third derivative of g(x) on x, and cg =
0.308 in this case.
The purpose for this determination is to alleviate the trust-
value enhancement for devices whose contact frequencies
are beyond the average. According to Fig.A17 (b), for any
registered device a, the climbing rate g′ reaches its maximum
value when x = 0. This indicates that the trustvalue adjustment
for a freshly joint device is relatively sensitive. Besides, g′′
presents the sensitivity of the variation of g′, which firstly has
a raise and then falls to a minimum value. In fact, if device a
behaves well continuously, it’s trustvalue will accordingly raise
with three phases: a rapid enhancement, an intense damping on
the climbing rate, and a relatively steady. Therefore, we set the
steady point of the device trustvalue climbing at the time that
the device accomplishes the average number of transactions
(i.e. Eq.(A1)).
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B. Determination of cw
Taking the quadratic function w(σ) = −cw(σ/σ¯)2 + 1 as
an instance, we assume that the average contact number of
registered devices within a trustvalue management cycle is 50.
The value of cw can be determined by solving:
f˙(1) = −1,where f(x) = −cwx2 + 1, (A2)
and cw = 0.5 in this case.
The purpose for this determination is to ensure a rapid
credibility damping for devices with abnormal intimacy. Ac-
cording to Fig.A18, the damping factor between a fixed pair
of devices, e.g. devices a and b, continuously drops in reverse
proportion to their intimacy. Intuitively, if the contact number
between a and b exceeds the average value, we’d like to
treat them as suspicious and increase the intensity of their
credibility damping rapidly. For f(x), we set x = σ/σ¯, and
the rate of credibility damping is f ′ = −x. Therefore, with
the determination of Eq.(A2), the credibility damping of a pair
of devices whose intimacy exceeds the average value would
be more intense than that of freshly encountered devices.
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APPENDIX B
A. Proof of CO1 Immunity.
Proposition 1. With TDP, adversary m cannot decrypt the
transmission payload eavesdropped from a D2D transaction
between device a and b.
Proof. According to Fig.5, the information that adversary m
can have includes Ppub, a(b), pka(b), Ua(b), Ca(b), Fa(b).
To decrypt the content eavesdropped, m needs kab = Sa =
Sb. The calculation of Sa requires Va and V ′b . However,
because of the intractability of ECDHP, m cannot retrieve la.
In addition, since ska = (da, xa) is privately held by a, m
cannot calculate V ′b . Moreover, for the ‘benign but curious’
BS (Subsection 3.2), it requires kab to decrypt the content
of D2D transactions. However, since la and lb are randomly
determined for each D2D transaction, it is not viable for BS
to get Va and Vb that are necessary to restore kab. 
B. Proof of CO2 Immunity.
Proposition 2. With TDP, adversary m cannot establish a
D2D connection with device b using a’s public credential.
Proof. According to Fig.5, the information that adversary m
can have includes Ppub, a(b), pka(b).
To initialize a device pairing with b, m requires V ′b to
calculate kmb. However, the calculation of V ′b is infeasible
since ska = (da, xa) is privately held by a, which will lead
to a failure in the successive key authentication. 
C. Proof of CO3 Immunity.
Proposition 3. With TDP, adversary m cannot intercept the
pairing process between device a and b by establishing D2D
connections with them respectively without being noticed.
Proof. Because of the infeasibility of CO2 attacks, according
to Fig.5, m has to choose an arbitrary public key (R′m, P ′m)
combined with the identity of b to pair with a. In this case,
m requires V ′a to generate kma. Since:
Va = lah0(b‖R′m‖P
′
m)Ppub + laR
′
m + laP
′
m,
m needs to calculate V ′a based on Ppub = xP and Ua = laP .
Since R′m = r′mP and P ′m = x′mP are determined by m, the
16
value of laR′m + laP ′m is computable through (r′m + x′m)Ua.
Then, since Ppub = xP , the rest of Va can be calculated by:
either lah0(b‖R′m‖P ′m)Ppub or xh0(b‖R′m‖P ′m)Ua.
However, for the first form, m cannot retrieve la because of the
intractability of ECDHP; for the second form, x is intractable
since it is privately held by the BS. 
D. Proof of TO1 Immunity.
Proposition 4. With TDP, adversary m cannot attract unfair
D2D transaction requests by fabricating its device trustvalue
tm as a higher t′m.
Proof. To convince the peer device a ∈ D with t′m, m needs
to generate a verifiable signature Sm = T ′4bs‖T ′5bs. However,
according to Eq.(14), m requires the value of x + rm to
generate Sm that can be verified using the public credentials of
both the BS and m. Since x and rm are privately held by the
BS, it is infeasible for m to fabricate a verifiable trustvalue.

E. Proof of TO2 Resistance.
Proposition 5. With TDP, adversary m cannot attract unfair
D2D transaction requests effectively by replying negative
ratings to any encountered device a ∈ D.
Proof. In D2D transactions between m and a, according to
Eq.(3), the credibility is determined by Em and Ea (together
wiht θm and θa). Since m keeps replying negative ratings to
others, according to Eq.(4) and (5), both sma and dma will
be lower than normal. Therefore, m will continuously receive
negative ratings that downgrade its trustvalue. 
F. Proof of TO3 Resistance.
Proposition 6. With TDP, collusive adversaries m1,m2 ∈
M cannot attract unfair D2D transaction requests effectively
by (1) replying positive ratings to each other, and (2) replying
negative ratings to any encountered device a1, a2 ∈ D.
Proof. Firstly, in D2D transactions between m1 and m2,
according to Eq.(4) and (5), they can guarantee a higher sm1m2
and dm1m2 . However, according to Eq.(7), the damping factor
wm1m2 will effectively restrict the value of cm1m2 if they con-
duct suspiciously more transactions than normal. Therefore,
the trustvalue enhancement coming from their collusion will
be suppressed.
Then, in D2D transactions between m1 and a1, since ratings
from them to other benign devices (e.g. device a2) are highly
different, sm1a1 will be low according to Eq.(4). Besides,
considering the highly different variation trends of θm1 and
θa1 , dm1a1 will be low according to Eq.(5). Therefore, m1
will continuously receive negative ratings that downgrade its
trustvalue while a1 will not be affected. 
